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Abstract
When one encounters disagreement about the truth of a factual claim
from a trusted advisor who has access to all of one’s evidence, should
that move one in the direction of the advisor’s view? Conciliatory
views on disagreement say “yes, at least a little.” Such views are ex-
tremely natural, but they can give incoherent advice when the issue
under dispute is disagreement itself. So conciliatory views stand re-
futed. But despite first appearances, this makes no trouble for partly
conciliatory views: views that recommend giving ground in the face
of disagreement about many matters, but not about disagreement it-
self.
1 Introduction
Suppose that you and a friend independently evaluate a factual claim,
based on the same relevant evidence and arguments. You become confi-
dent that the claim is true. But then you find out that your friend—whose
judgment you respect—has become just as confident that the claim is false.
Should that news at all reduce your confidence in the disputed claim?
Conciliatory views on disagreement answer “yes.” According to such
views, finding out that a respected advisor disagrees with one should
move one at least a little in the direction of the advisor’s view. And it
should do so regardless of the subject matter under dispute. Conciliatory
views are extremely natural and appealing. But they seem to run into
trouble when the topic under dispute is disagreement itself. Can concilia-
tory views accommodate disagreement about disagreement? And if not,
what does this show about what view on disagreement we should adopt
instead?
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I will consider two arguments that conciliatory views cannot accom-
modate disagreement about disagreement. Though the first argument
fails, the second argument succeeds. So conciliatory views are unaccept-
able. But the considerations that show this make no trouble for views that
are partly conciliatory: views that recommend compromise in the face of
disagreement about many matters, but not about disagreement itself.
2 First argument against conciliatory views: repeated disagreements with the
stubborn
Can conciliatory views accommodate disagreement about disagreement?
Here is a reason to think not.1 Suppose that you and your friend disagree
about the right response to disagreement. You have a conciliatory view,
but you realize that your friend has the stubborn view, according to which
disagreement is never cause for changing one’s view on a disputed issue.
It can sometimes seem as though your conciliatory nature dooms you to
conceding everything to your stubborn friend, given enough discussion.
Here is a representative scenario:
You think it will rain tomorrow, and your friend thinks it won’t.
(Here and henceforth I assume that you respect the opinions of
all of your friends, and that you and your friends have the same
evidence relevant to contested issues.) In response to the dis-
agreement, you are conciliatory: you reduce your confidence
that it will rain. But your friend is stubborn: he remains com-
pletely unmoved.
After this first stage, a (slightly less extreme) disagreement about
the weather remains. Again you are conciliatory, and further
reduce your confidence that it will rain. And again, your friend
stands fast.
Disagreement still remains. You reduce your confidence a third
time, and so on. As the discussion continues, you get pushed
arbitrarily close to completely adopting your friend’s view on
whether it will rain.
1I haven’t seen this objection in print (though see Weatherson (2007, 8)), but have
encountered it repeatedly in conversation. It deserves to be put to rest.
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In this case, it looks as though your conciliatory nature commits you
to conceding increasingly much, the more times you pool opinions with
your stubborn friend. And this looks to be a general phenomenon. If so,
that counts against conciliatory views on disagreement. For it is implau-
sible that one should be required to give so much ground to an advisor
just because the advisor is stubborn. A similar difficulty arises in the case
of advisors who are not completely stubborn, but who have a policy of
conceding very little in cases of disagreement.
That is the first argument against conciliatory views on disagreement.
3 Reply: conciliatory folk needn’t concede everything to stubborn folk
Here is a reply: Sensible conciliatory views do not entail that one should
concede arbitrarily much to stubborn advisors.
To see why not, imagine a cluster of advisors who you know to exhibit
an extreme form of groupthink: they always end up agreeing with one
another. Now, you may well respect the opinions of that group. So you
may well be moved if you find out that one of them disagrees with you
about a particular issue. But suppose that you then find out that another
member of the group also disagrees with you about that issue. That news
does not call for any additional change in your view. For you knew in
advance that the group members all think alike. So hearing the second
dissenting opinion gives you no real new information.
In contrast, suppose that you receive an additional dissenting opinion
from an advisor who formed her opinions completely independently from
your first advisor. In that case, the second dissenting opinion does call for
additional caution. The difference is that in this case you didn’t know in
advance what conclusion the second advisor would reach.
The general point is that an additional outside opinion should move
one only to the extent that one counts it as independent from opinions one
has already taken into account.2 The above example illustrates the most
extreme version of this point: When one knows with certainty in advance
what an advisor thinks, hearing that advisor’s opinion should have no im-
pact. But the point also holds in less extreme cases. For example, suppose
that two of your friends almost always think alike. Then hearing that the
first friend disagrees with you should have a big impact on your opinion.
2Compare Kelly (2007).
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But suppose that you later learn that the second friend endorses the judg-
ment of the first. That news should only have a tiny additional impact on
your opinion.
The above independence point is completely uncontroversial, and ev-
ery sensible view on disagreement should accommodate it.3 Furthermore,
conciliatory views on disagreement face no special difficulties in doing so.
Now return to the case in which you disagree about the weather with a
stubborn friend. When you find out about the initial disagreement, you
should indeed be significantly moved in the direction of your friend’s
view. But at the second stage, news of the disagreement should not move
you at all. The reason is the same as in the groupthink case: Since you
knew in advance about your friend’s stubborn nature, his continued dis-
agreement provides you with no additional news. Putting things another
way: You count his opinion at the first stage of the dispute as completely
correlated with his opinion at subsequent stages. As a result, a sensible
conciliatory view will counsel you to remain unmoved at the second and
subsequent stages.
A similar analysis applies in the case of an advisor who is not com-
pletely stubborn, but who has a known policy of conceding very little in
cases of disagreement. The initial disagreement of such an advisor should
have a big impact on your opinion. But when the advisor keeps putting
forward the same view in subsequent disagreements, that should have lit-
tle or no additional impact.
Moral: Sensible conciliatory views do not require one to concede ev-
erything to stubborn advisors. That answers the argument.
3For example, according to the Equal Weight View (Elga 2007) it is a constraint on
rationality that one’s probability in a disputed claim match one’s prior probability in the
claim, conditional on what one has learned about the circumstances of the disagreement
(see Elga (2007, footnote 26)). But when one is certain in advance what an advisor’s reac-
tion to the claim will be, that prior conditional probability will equal one’s prior uncon-
ditional probability in the claim. So the Equal Weight View is consistent with the above
observation about additional opinions (that hearing an additional opinion should only
move one to the extent that one counts it as independent of information one has already
taken into account).
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4 Second argument against conciliatory views: such views undermine them-
selves
Next argument.
Just as people disagree about politics and the weather, so too people
disagree about the right response to disagreement. For example, people
disagree about whether a conciliatory view on disagreement is right. So a
view on disagreement should offer advice on how to respond to disagree-
ment about disagreement. But conciliatory views on disagreement run
into trouble in offering such advice.
The trouble is this: In many situations involving disagreement about
disagreement, conciliatory views call for their own rejection. But it is in-
coherent for a view on disagreement to call for its own rejection. So con-
ciliatory views on disagreement are incoherent. That is the argument.4
To see why conciliatory views sometimes call for their own rejection,
consider an example. Suppose that you have a conciliatory view on dis-
agreement, but you find out that your respected friend disagrees. He has
arrived at a competing view (about disagreement), and tells you all about
it. If your conciliatory view is correct, you should change your view. You
should be pulled part way toward thinking that your friend is right. In
other words, your view on disagreement requires you to give up your
view on disagreement.
One might try to avoid this result by adding a special restriction to
one’s conciliatory view. For example, might say that one should in gen-
eral be moved by disagreement, but not when the disputed topic is dis-
agreement itself. But such a restriction seems objectionably arbitrary and
ad hoc.5 If one should be sensitive to disagreement about so many other
matters, then why not about disagreement, too? (Certainly not because
disagreement is an easy or uncontroversial topic, as the existence of this
volume attests.)
So: Conciliatory views on disagreement sometimes call for their own
rejection. The next section explains why views on disagreement that call
for their own rejection are incoherent. It will follow that conciliatory views
4I first learned of this objection from an unpublished early draft of Kelly (2005), which
discusses the objectionwithout endorsing it. Weatherson (2007) has independently raised
and developed an objection of this kind.
5Disclosure: it will later emerge that a similar restriction should be imposed. But it will
take real work to explain away the seeming arbitrariness of doing so.
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on disagreement are incoherent.
5 Self-undermining views are incoherent
Why is it incoherent for a view on disagreement to call for its own rejec-
tion? To see why, notice that one’s view on disagreement is part of one’s
inductive method: one’s fundamental method for taking evidence into ac-
count. An inductive method offers recommendations on what to believe
based on one’s course of experience. Given a course of experience, an in-
ductive method says what one should believe about various topics: the
weather, who will win the next election, and so on. It even says how a
given course of experience bears on the question: Which inductivemethod
should one use?
Now suppose that one’s view on disagreement sometimes calls for its
own rejection. Then one’s inductive method also sometimes calls for its
own rejection. For one’s view on disagreement is part of one’s inductive
method.6 So in order to show that self-undermining views on disagree-
ment are incoherent, it is enough to show that self-undermining inductive
methods are incoherent.
That is best illustrated by the following example.7
Themagazine Consumer Reports rates appliances, and gives recommen-
dations on which ones to buy. But pretend that in addition to rating ap-
pliances, Consumer Reports also rates and recommends consumer ratings
magazines. Then it cannot coherently recommend a competing magazine
over itself. (By a “competing magazine” I mean a magazine that offers
contrary appliance recommendations.)
To see why not, consider an example. Suppose that Consumer Reports
says, “Buy only Toaster X,” while Smart Shopper says, “Buy only Toaster
Y.” And suppose that Consumer Reports also says, “Consumer Reports is
worthless. Smart Shopper magazine is the ratings magazine to follow.”
Then Consumer Reports offers inconsistent advice about toasters. For on
6More slowly: Suppose that one has view V on disagreement, and suppose that one
has inductive methodM. Then viewVmust be part of methodM. So if (given a particular
course of experience) view V says to reject view V, M must (given that same course
of experience) say to reject view V. That is because M says everything V says. But to
reject view V is to reject M, since V is part of M. So M says to reject M. So if V is self-
undermining, then M is also self-undermining.
7The Consumer Reports analogy is adapted from Lewis (1971, 55).
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the one hand, it says directly to buy only Toaster X. But on the other hand,
it also says to trust Smart Shopper, which says to buy only Toaster Y. And
it is impossible to follow both pieces of advice.
In other words:
1. Consumer Reports says: “Buy only toaster X.”
2. Smart Shopper says: “Buy only toaster Y.”
3. Consumer Reports says: “Follow the advice of Smart Shopper.”
Given what Smart Shopper says about toasters, items 1 and 3 offer conflict-
ing advice. So Consumer Reports gives conflicting advice about toasters.
And a similar conflict arises in any case in which Consumer Reports recom-
mends a competing magazine over itself.
Moral: No consumer rating magazine can coherently recommend a
competingmagazine over itself. For the same reason, no inductivemethod
can coherently recommend a competing inductive method over itself. Let
me explain, using an argument adapted from Field (2000, 131).
Just as a consumer ratings magazine tells one how to shop, an induc-
tive method tells one how to respond to various courses of experience. An
inductivemethod says something of the form, “Given course of experience
E1, adopt such-and-such belief state. Given course of experience E2, adopt
so-and-so belief state. Given course of experience E3, adopt blah-blah-blah
belief state, ...” In other words, an inductive method puts forward a rule
for responding to possible courses of experience.
One small bit of terminology: Given an initial course of experience, let
us say that two inductive methods are competitors (and that each is a com-
peting method to the other) if they offer contrary recommendations about
how to respond to some possible subsequent experience.
Now: It is incoherent for an inductive method to recommend two in-
compatible responses to a single course of experience. But that is exactly
what amethod does if it ever recommends a competingmethod over itself.
For example, suppose that inductive methods M and N offer contrary
advice on how to respond to the course of experience “See lightning, then
see a rainbow.” In particular, suppose:
1. MethodM says: “In response to seeing lightning and then a rainbow,
adopt belief state X.”
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2. Method N says: “In response to seeing lightning and then a rainbow,
adopt belief state Y.”
(Assume that it is impossible to adopt both belief states X and Y.) But also
suppose that M sometimes calls for its own rejection:
1. Method M says: “In response to seeing lightning, stop following
method M and start following method N.”
Then method M offers inconsistent advice. On the one hand, it directly
recommends belief state X in response to seeing lightning and then a rain-
bow. But on the other hand, it also says that seeing lightning should make
one follow method N, which recommends belief state Y in response to
seeing lightning and then a rainbow. And it is impossible to follow both
pieces of advice. So method M gives incoherent advice about how to re-
spond to seeing lightning then a rainbow. And a similar conflict arises in
any case in which an inductive method recommends a competing method
over itself.8
So: Just as a consumer ratings magazine cannot consistently recom-
mend a competing magazine, an inductive method cannot consistently
recommend a competing method. In other words, self-undermining in-
ductive methods are incoherent. It follows that conciliatory views on dis-
agreement are incoherent. Call this the self-undermining problem.
Bottom line: The self-undermining problem shows that conciliatory
views on disagreement should be rejected.
8It might be thought that some conciliatory views on disagreement avoid this problem
because they do not entirely call for their own rejection. Rather, they merely call for their
own partial rejection. For example, consider a case in which someone with a conciliatory
view—call it C—learns about a respected friend’s competing view of disagreement—call
it D. The conciliatory view need not say in this case, “Reject C and adopt D.” Instead it
might say, “Become uncertain as to whether C or D is the right view on disagreement.”
But even views on disagreement that call for their own partial rejection are incoherent.
For notice that when one shifts one’s view about the right way to respond to disagree-
ment, one should correspondingly shift the way one responds to subsequent disagree-
ments. In particular, when the above subject shifts his confidence away from view C and
towards view D, that should correspondingly change the inductive method he imple-
ments. It won’t be as dramatic a change as if he had become completely converted to
view D, but it will be a change nonetheless. In other words, even in this sort of case, view
C calls for a change in inductive method. And for certain choices of view D, view C calls
for a change to a competing inductive method. But now the argument in the main text ap-
plies. For that argument applies to any inductive method that recommends a competing
method over itself.
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6 Reply to the self-undermining problem for conciliatory views
There is no good reply. Conciliatory views stand refuted.
7 If conciliatory views are wrong, should we adopt an uncompromising view
instead?
Conciliatory views get into trouble because they require one to be concil-
iatory about absolutely everything, even their own correctness. But we have
seen that it is incoherent to be conciliatory about absolutely everything.9
So conciliatory views are no good. What view should we adopt instead?
We might adopt a view that is conciliatory about many matters, but not
about disagreement itself. But as noted before, such views seem to require
arbitrary and ad hoc restrictions.
Alternatively, we might adopt a view that avoids the self-undermining
problem without imposing special restrictions. We have already seen one
such view: the stubborn view. The stubborn view avoids the self-undermining
problem because according to the stubborn view, disagreement about dis-
agreement shouldn’t at all affect one’s views on disagreement. So there is
no threat of the stubborn view ever calling for its own rejection.
Amore plausible view that also avoids trouble in cases of disagreement
about disagreement is the right-reasons view.10 The right-reasons view
is best explained with an example: Dee and Dum independently assess a
claim, based on the same batch of evidence E.When they later find out that
they came to opposite conclusions, how should they react? According to
9So it is a good thing that some authors who defend conciliation in a great range of
cases stop short of advocating it across the board. For example, Feldman (2007) gives
arguments that favor suspending judgment in symmetric cases of disagreement. But he
only claims that suspension of judgment is required “At least for some range of hard
cases.” (Feldman 2007, 212). Similarly Christensen (2007, 189) limits his endorsment of
conciliation to a restricted range of cases: “I shall argue that in a great many cases [of peer
disagreement] of the sort van Inwagen and others seem to have in mind, I should change
my degree of confidence significantly toward that of my friend [emphasis added].” Even
the Equal Weight View (Elga 2007) falls short of requiring conciliation about all topics.
For that view takes the form of a constraint on conditional probabilities (see footnote 3).
As a result, the view is compatible with thinking that agents should have probability 1 in
certain propositions, and that no news of disagreement should reduce that probability.
10The right-reasons view is a simplified version of the view defended in (Kelly 2005,
180).
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the right-reasons view, that depends on what conclusion evidence E in fact
supports. For example, suppose that E supports Dee’s conclusion. Then
in reaction to the disagreement, Dee should stick to that conclusion, and
Dum should switch to it.
More generally, the right-reasons view says that in the face of disagree-
ment, one should adopt whatever view one’s original evidence in fact sup-
ports. Here one’s “original evidence” is the evidence that one had before
finding out about anyone else’s conclusions.
The right-reasons view has no special trouble accommodating disagree-
ment about disagreement. For example: Suppose that your evidence strongly
supports the right-reasons view, and that as a result you hold the right-
reasons view. And suppose that you learn that a respected advisor holds
a different view about disagreement. According to the right-reasons view,
this should not at all weaken your confidence in the right-reasons view. In
other words, according to the right-reasons view, encountering disagree-
ment about disagreement in this case should have no effect at all on your
opinions about disagreement. Other cases are similar.
Both the stubborn view and the right-reasons views are uncompromis-
ing in the following sense: Each entails that if one has correctly judged
how one’s original evidence bears on a claim, then just finding out that a
respected advisor disagrees should not at all change one’s confidence in
the claim. In other words, while conciliatory views say that disagreement
should always move one, these uncompromising views say that disagree-
ment should never do so (provided that one has correctly responded to
one’s original evidence).
So: We have seen two ways that a view on disagreement can coher-
ently handle cases of disagreement about disagreement. The view can be
partially conciliatory, and say that one should be moved by disagreement
about some subject matters, but not about disagreement itself. Or it can
be uncompromising and say that one should not be moved by disagree-
ment about any topic (provided that one has correctly responded to one’s
original evidence). But partially conciliatory views seem to require arbi-
trary and ad hoc restrictions. So the undermining problem seems to favor
adopting an uncompromising view (Weatherson 2007, 8).
But this is an illusion. It is not at all arbitrary for a view on disagree-
ment to treat disagreement about disagreement in a special way. So the
self-undermining problem is no evidence for uncompromising views about
disagreement. Here is why.
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8 The source of the self-undermining problem
It looks arbitrary for a view to recommend that one be conciliatory about
most matters, but not about disagreement itself. But in fact no arbitrari-
ness is required. For the discussion of Consumer Reports and inductive
methods shows that it is in the nature of giving consistent advice that one’s
advice be dogmatic with respect to its own correctness. And views on dis-
agreement give advice on how to respond to evidence. So in order to be
consistent, views on disagreement must be dogmatic with respect to their
own correctness.
In other words, the real reason for constraining conciliatory views is
not specific to disagreement. Rather, the real reason is a completely gen-
eral constraint that applies to any fundamental11 policy, rule, or method.
In order to be consistent, a fundamental policy, rule or method must be
dogmatic with respect to its own correctness. This general constraint pro-
vides independent motivation for a view on disagreement to treat dis-
agreement about disagreement in a special way. So partly conciliatory
views need no ad hoc restrictions in order to avoid the self-undermining
problem. They only need restrictions that are independently motivated.
Let me illustrate the point with a Consumer Reports example. Suppose
that for twenty-eight years in a row, Consumer Reports rates itself as the #1
consumer ratingsmagazine. A picky reader might complain to the editors:
You are evenhanded and rigorous when rating toasters and
cars. But you obviously have an ad hoc exception to your stan-
dards for consumer magazines. You always rate yourself #1!
Please apply your rigorous standards across the board in the
future.
This complaint has no force. The editors should reply:
To put forward our recommendations about toasters and cars is
to put them forward as good recommendations. And we can’t
consistently do that while also claiming that contrary recom-
mendations are superior. So our always rating ourselves #1
does not result from an arbitrary or ad hoc exception to our
11A fundamental method is one whose application is not governed or evaluated by any
other method. See Field (2000, Appendix).
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standards. We are forced to rate ourselves #1 in order to be
consistent with our other ratings.
The same point holds for views of disagreement. Just as Consumer Re-
ports has good independent motivation to avoid recommending a com-
peting magazine, so too a view on disagreement has good independent
motivation to avoid calling for its own rejection. In particular, partly con-
ciliatory views have good independent motivation for treating the case of
disagreement about disagreement differently from cases of, say, disagree-
ment about the weather.
Bottom line: Partly conciliatory views need no ad hoc restrictions to
avoid the self-undermining problem. So the self-undermining problem
does not favor uncompromising views over partly conciliatory ones. So
even though considerations arising from disagreement about disagree-
ment refute views that are conciliatory about every topic, they are no evi-
dence against views that are conciliatory about a great many topics.
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